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Some policymakers in the United States and
Europe argue that it is possible to enjoy economic
growth and also have a large welfare state. These
advocates for bigger government claim that the so-
called Nordic Model offers the best of both worlds.
This claim does not withstand scrutiny. Eco-
nomic performance in Nordic nations is lagging,
and excessive government is the most likely expla-
nation. The public sector in Sweden, Denmark,
Norway, Finland, and Iceland consumes, on aver-
age, more than 48 percent of economic output.
Total government outlays in the United States, by
contrast, are less than 37 percent of gross domes-
tic product. Revenue comparisons are even more
striking. Tax receipts average more than 45 per-
cent of GDP in Nordic nations, a full 20 percent-
age points higher than the aggregate tax burden in
the United States.
This bigger burden of government hurts
Nordic competitiveness, both because govern-
ment spending consumes resources that could be
more efficiently allocated by market forces and
because the accompanying high tax rates discour-
age productive behavior. A smaller state sector is
one reason why the United States is more pros-
perous. Per capita GDP in the United States is
more than 15 percent higher than it is in the
Nordic nations. The gap is even larger when com-
paring disposable income, private consumption,
and other measures that reflect living standards. 
Notwithstanding problems associated with a
large welfare state, there is much to applaud in
Nordic nations. They have open markets, low lev-
els of regulation, strong property rights, stable
currencies, and many other policies associated
with growth and prosperity. Indeed, Nordic
nations generally rank among the world’s most
market-oriented nations.
Nordic nations also have implemented some
pro-market reforms. Every Nordic nation has a
lower corporate tax rate than the United States,
for example, and most of them have low-rate flat
tax systems for capital income. Iceland even has
a flat tax for labor income. And both Iceland and
Sweden have partially privatized their social
security retirement systems.
The Nordic nations offer valuable lessons for
policymakers, but they do not fit the traditional
stereotype. Conservative critics correctly con-
demn the large welfare states, but often overlook
the positive results generated by laissez-faire
policies in other areas. Liberals, meanwhile, exag-
gerate the economic performance of Nordic
nations in an effort to justify welfare-state poli-
cies, while failing to acknowledge the role of free-
market policies in other areas.
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Introduction
Economic policy debates frequently revolve
around the experiences of other nations.
Conservatives often cite Hong Kong when
they advocate the flat tax, Ireland as evidence
for lower corporate tax rates, and Australia
and Chile to show the benefits of personal
retirement accounts. Liberals often invoke the
Nordic nations as evidence that it is possible
to have a large welfare state without sacrificing
too much growth. 
Proponents of this view argue that the
United States should emulate Sweden, Den-
mark, Norway, Finland, and Iceland. The so-
called Nordic Model (alternatively known as
the Swedish Model or Scandinavian Model) is
often cited by those who want an alternative to
the supposedly Darwinistic free-market sys-
tem of the Anglo-Saxon world. For instance:
• A study published by a government-sub-
sidized think tank in Brussels asserts,
“The ‘Nordic’ and the ‘Anglo-Saxon’
models are both efficient, but only the
former manages to combine both equi-
ty and efficiency.”1
• Foreign-aid advocate Jeffrey Sachs claims,
“The Nordic countries outperform the
Anglo-Saxon ones on most measures of
economic performance.”2
• An article in the International Herald
Tribune states, “European leaders want to
know how Sweden and its Nordic neigh-
bors, so heavily laden with cradle-to-
grave welfare systems, float high.”3
• The head of the Tax Policy Centre for the
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development recently bragged that
taxes are twice as high in Sweden as they
are in the United States, but that eco-
nomic growth is twice as fast.4
Some praise for the Nordic Model is under-
standable. Compared to most other European
nations, Nordic nations are doing well.
Average annual growth rates over the past 10
years range from 2.1 percent in Denmark to
4.3 percent in Iceland.5 Unemployment rates
are all below 9 percent, with Iceland enjoying a
jobless rate of just 2.6 percent.6 Per capita GDP
also is reasonably impressive, especially com-
pared to most parts of the world, ranging
from nearly $43,600 in oil-rich Norway to
slightly more than $34,400 in Sweden.7
Before drawing conclusions about the
desirability of the Nordic model, however, it
is important to answer three relevant ques-
tions:
1. Why are Nordic nations relatively rich?
2. Has the welfare state has helped or hin-
dered these countries’ economic perfor-
mance?
3. Does the Nordic Model create more
prosperity than the (relatively speaking)
limited-government model in the United
States?
The answer to all of those questions is that
Nordic nations are reasonably successful in
spite of the welfare state. Nordic countries ben-
efit from institutions—such as property rights,
stable currencies, and the rule of law—that
facilitate economic growth. And although they
have large welfare states and concomitantly
high levels of taxation, their economic systems
in other respects are very market-oriented.
Combined with the fact that before the mid-
1960s the burden of government in Nordic
nations was modest, these factors help explain
why those countries today are relatively pros-
perous.
But relative prosperity does not imply that
the welfare state is good for growth, and it
certainly does not suggest that the Nordic
Model should be adopted by nations with
smaller governments. The United States can
learn something from the Nordic Model, but
the main lesson is that a large welfare state
reduces economic performance. 
The main difference between the American
system and the Nordic Model is that America
has a medium-size welfare state and the Nordic
nations have large welfare states. That explains,
at least in part, why the U.S. economy general-
ly outperforms the Nordic Model. Income is
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higher in America, unemployment is lower,
and long-term growth is more impressive.
High levels of government spending in Nordic
nations have hindered economic performance.
Excessive spending invariably creates a culture
of dependency and misallocates a nation’s eco-
nomic resources. A heavy burden of govern-
ment also requires an onerous tax burden, even
if a government seeks to raise revenue in a rela-
tively nondestructive manner. 
Comparing the United States
and the Nordic Nations
The two main ways of comparing eco-
nomic performance are rate of growth and
level of output. One measures how fast gross
domestic product (or some similar measure
of economic output) is expanding. The other
compares the absolute level of economic out-
put (or some similar measure of prosperity).
By both measures, the Nordic nations gener-
ally do not fare well when compared to the
United States.
The OECD and the International Monetary
Fund publish comprehensive economic data
that can be used to compare growth rates in
America and the five Nordic countries.8 As seen
in Figure 1, this data shows that the United
States has enjoyed a faster rate of growth.
According to the OECD, the U.S. grew by an
average of 3 percent between 1981 and 1991
and 3.3 percent between 1992 and 2006 (mean-
ing average growth of 3.2 percent for 1981 to
2006). The Nordic nations, by contrast, grew
by an average of 2.2 percent between 1981 and
1991 and 2.7 percent from 1992 to 2006
(meaning average growth of 2.5 percent over
the entire period). The IMF, meanwhile,
reports that U.S. growth averaged 3.1 percent
from 1981–2006 compared to an average of 2.6
percent for Nordic nations in the same period.9
Some might argue that the faster rate of
economic growth in the United States is the
result of more rapid population growth. But
that explains only a fraction of the difference.
Moreover, differences in population growth
are irrelevant when examining per capita eco-
nomic output, and America clearly enjoys a
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Faster Growth in the United States
Sources: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Monetary Fund.
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Figure 2
Americans Enjoy More Output
Source: World Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Monetary Fund, Central
Intelligence Agency.
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Figure 3
Higher Levels of Disposable Income in the United States
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
large advantage using this comparison. As
seen in Figure 2, measures of per capita GDP
from the World Bank, the OECD, the IMF,
and the CIA all show that Americans have
about $6,000 of additional economic output
per person, significantly more than $20,000
for each family of four.
Although per capita GDP is an excellent
measure of overall economic output relative
to population, it does not necessarily mea-
sure living standards. Comparing U.S. and
Nordic living standards requires numbers for
disposable income or personal consumption.
Fortunately, both types of numbers are avail-
able. In both cases, the figures demonstrate
that GDP statistics actually understate the
degree to which people in Nordic nations
have lower living standards compared to
their American counterparts.
The OECD, for instance, has two data
series for disposable income, both included in
Figure 3. According to a study using 2003
data, the average person in the United States
had more than $27,000 of disposable income,
while the average person in Nordic nations
(no data available for Iceland) had disposable
income of barely $14,300, less than 53 percent
of the U.S. level.10 Even Norwegians, bolstered
by oil wealth, had per capita disposable
income of less than $16,800, barely 62 percent
of the American level. Danes and Finns are at
the bottom, with less than 50 percent of the
disposable income of the average American. A
separate data series, which includes numbers
for Iceland, is more flattering to Nordic
nations. Per capita disposable income in
America barely changes, but the average dis-
posable income for Nordic nations climbs by
more than $3,000.11 But even if this data
series is more accurate, the average resident of
a Nordic nation has only 65 percent of the
disposable income of the average American.
Personal consumption numbers tell a simi-
lar story. In 2005, the Danish Finance Ministry
produced numbers comparing per capita pri-
vate consumption in OECD nations.12 As seen
in Figure 4, the average person in Nordic
nations has barely 51 percent as much private
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Higher Living Standards in America
Source: Danish Finance Ministry.
D
an
ish
 K
ro
ne
consumption as an average American. The
Norwegians are the most prosperous, but even
their private consumption is just 56 percent of
U.S. levels. Both the Swedes and the Finns have
less than 50 percent of the private consump-
tion of average Americans.
Defenders of the welfare state could re-
spond by arguing that people in Nordic nations
do not need to worry about financing their own
consumption because the government takes
care of so many expenses. The Danish Finance
Ministry study includes figures on individual
consumption per capita, which includes items
“paid for by the public sector.” This shrinks the
gap, but Figure 4 shows that the U.S. retains a
large advantage. Norwegians are the best
regional performers and Finns are the worst,
but gaps between individual Nordic nations are
trivial compared to the gap between all the
Nordic nations and the United States.
Even those numbers may overstate the
prosperity of Nordic nations. According to a
KPMG study, which attracted some attention
in the Norwegian press, Scandinavians are the
poorest people in Western Europe once
income is adjusted for taxes and the cost of liv-
ing. Danes had the lowest adjusted income, fol-
lowed by the Norwegians and the Swedes.
Finland managed to edge out Belgium, so the
four Nordic countries in the survey occupied
four of the bottom five slots.13
Where’s the Convergence?
Whether measured by annual growth
rates or levels of output, income, or con-
sumption, Nordic nations have inferior eco-
nomic performance when compared to the
United States. This does not mean Nordic
nations are economically unsuccessful. Nor
does it mean that the United States economy
is without flaws. But it does mean that it is
rather absurd to claim that, as Jeffrey Sachs
does, that “the Nordic countries outperform
the Anglo-Saxon ones on most measures of
economic performance.”
The performance gap between America
and the Nordic nations is particularly note-
worthy since economic theory generally
assumes that a nation with less income
should grow faster than a nation with more
income. This phenomenon, known as conver-
gence, is based in part on the relatively non-
controversial proposition that more invest-
ment will flow to a poorer nation to take
advantage of lower production costs and
more profit-making opportunities. 
There was substantial convergence for sev-
eral decades after World War II, largely
because European nations suffered so much
damage during the conflict and started with
low levels of income. But after several decades
of strong growth, economic performance in
European nations—including Nordic coun-
tries began to wane. And beginning in the
1980s, following Reagan-era reforms to
reduce the burden of government, the United
States has widened its lead. As Figure 5 illus-
trates, the United States has maintained a
steady advantage over Nordic nations in com-
parisons of per capita GDP.14
Not all Nordic nations are the same, of
course, so “average” calculations often dis-
guise important differences. Figure 6, for
instance, shows per capita GDP figures for the
individual Nordic nations measured as a share
of U.S. output based on OECD and IMF data.
Oil-rich Norway stands out as the strongest
economy of the Nordic nations, surpassing
even the United States according to IMF fig-
ures. Sweden and Finland, by contrast, are the
least impressive nations in the region.
Other Measures of
Prosperity
Unemployment is often one of the main
indicators of economic vitality. Nordic
nations generally have low levels of unemploy-
ment. Indeed, the average unemployment rate
is not significantly higher than the American
level. Iceland, Denmark, and Norway have
especially strong job markets, while Finland
and Sweden lag. 
Youth unemployment figures show a simi-
lar pattern. The United States has a slightly
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Nordic Nations Consistently Lag U.S. Economic Output
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Sources: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Monetary Fund.
lower rate of unemployment for ages 16-24,
but the difference is not large and Denmark
and Iceland actually have better numbers than
America. Statistics for long-term unemploy-
ment, however, are not flattering for Nordic
nations. More than 18 percent of the unem-
ployed in Nordic nations have been out of
work for more than 12 months. In the United
States, by contrast, fewer than 12 percent of
the unemployed have been jobless that long.15
Another noteworthy feature of labor mar-
kets in Nordic nations is the role of govern-
ment as a major employer. As noted by a
German think tank, “On average, the share of
state employment in total dependent employ-
ment across Scandinavia is 32.7%, compared
to only 18.5% in the non-Scandinavian coun-
tries of the EU-15.”16 In the United States, gov-
ernment workers account for slightly more
than 15 percent of the workforce.17 Moreover,
the same researchers say that some Nordic
nations are prone to re-characterize welfare
beneficiaries as government employees, a prac-
tice that artificially overstates economic out-
put (since government salaries are added to
GDP) and artificially understates unemploy-
ment.18
Proponents of the Nordic model argue that
the United States does not have an advantage
in every measure of prosperity and the quality
of life, and they often cite leisure time as an
important variable. It is certainly true that
Americans spend more time on the job. As
seen in Figure 7, Americans spend more time
each year working than the residents of every
Nordic nation. According to OECD data, only
people in Finland and Iceland work similar
hours to Americans, while Norwegians work
400 fewer hours each year.19 The Nordic
Statistical Yearbook has weekly labor supply
estimates that show a similar pattern, with
Americans working 41 hours per week while
residents of Nordic nations work between 35
and 38 hours each week.20
It is unclear, though, whether working fewer
hours than Americans translates into more
leisure time for people in Nordic nations. The
workweek is composed not only of hours in
paid employment, but also of time spent in
household production (cooking, cleaning,
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household repairs and maintenance, etc). There
are not many cross-country studies of house-
hold work, so comparing America and the
Nordic nations is rather difficult. But a Swedish
study found that 90 percent of the gap between
the hours worked by Swedes and Americans dis-
appeared once household production was
added to the equation. Inferences can also be
drawn by comparing the United States and
Germany. A German study explains: “On aver-
age Americans and Germans spend roughly the
same hours working, but Americans spend
more time in market work while Germans
spend more hours in household production.
Americans do not work longer hours than
Germans overall, but they allocate a larger share
of working time to gainful employment and
invest less in self-provision.”21 The study
explains that tax policy is a key factor. 
Moreover, even if people in Nordic nations
truly have more leisure time, it is not necessar-
ily what they prefer. As the president of the
European Central Bank recently remarked:
Lower participation rates are not neces-
sarily solely associated with personal
preferences, but are also triggered by
the legal and regulatory environment,
tax systems and social institutions.
Benefit systems that are too generous
discourage job search, early retirement
schemes encourage early withdrawal
from the labour market—employment
rates for older workers aged 55–64
stood at just 40.2% in the euro area in
2005 and, according to the OECD, at
around 60% in the U.S.—and marginal
tax rates that are too high discourage
labour market entry and have a down-
ward effect on average hours worked.22
A study from the Bank confirms this
analysis. It explains that “while the overall tax
wedge in the euro area currently amounts to
roughly 64 percent of the earnings of an aver-
age production worker, that of the United
States is limited to about 37 percent.” It then
reports: “Our analysis using the [New Area-
Wide Model] confirms the widely-held view
that reductions in tax distortions have bene-
ficial effects on labour-market outcomes and
general economic performance. In fact, low-
ering euro area tax wedges to levels prevailing
in the United States is found to result in a rise
in hours worked and output by more than 10
percent in the long run.”23
An OECD study also threw cold water on
the assertion that Europeans have freely cho-
sen to work less:
The leisure time enjoyed by individuals
is obviously important for any evalua-
tion of well-being, and workers’ choices
on how to allocate their time have a
direct bearing on cross-country com-
parisons of economic aggregates. . . . As
European workers worked more than
their US counterparts up to the late
1960s, it is difficult to invoke long-
standing cultural differences to explain
current labour-utilisation patterns. A
different explanation focuses on the
role of policies and institutions, which
may both depress and boost working
hours. . . . [R]elatively low hours worked
per person in Europe can be fully
explained by policy distortions arising
from high marginal taxes on labour.24
Shifting to another measure of prosperity,
cross-country wealth data is relatively scarce
and presumably less precise than income data,
but the figures that are available show that the
United States has a large advantage in per capi-
ta wealth.25 Indeed, as shown in Figure 8,
Americans have twice the household wealth of
Swedes, Finns, and Norwegians (no data avail-
able for Iceland and Denmark). Americans also
own more consumer products, particularly
durable equipment such as automobiles and
household appliances.26 Americans also enjoy
more housing. Indeed, poor people in the
United States have as much housing space as
the average European.27 As stated above, none
of these comparisons suggest that Nordic
nations are economic failures. Indeed, they are
among the world’s wealthiest economies, but
high taxes and excessive government spending
9
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mean that they are not as wealthy as they could
be. It also means they trail the United States in
almost all measures of economic success.
Last but not least, defenders of the Nordic
Model argue that the United States suffers
from greater levels of income inequality.
Various measures of inequality, such as Gini
coefficients, confirm that “wealthy” Americans
earn a bigger share of the pie than upper-
income citizens in Nordic nations. But this
data is incomplete without also looking at the
size of the pie. 
As illustrated in Figure 9, the poorest 10
percent of Americans have about the same
level of income as the poorest 10 percent of
Finns, Swedes, and Danes. Only in oil-rich
Norway is there a noticeable gap (data for
Iceland not available). What differentiates
America from the Nordic nations is the
income of everyone else. The rich, the middle
class, and the working class in the United
States enjoy higher levels of income than their
Nordic counterparts.28
If nations are being judged on the pros-
perity of their poorest citizens, then Nordic
nations certainly are equal to the United
States. Indeed, they even have a slight advan-
tage (though even that advantage might dis-
appear if Nordic nations had US levels of
immigration). But if nations are being
judged on factors beyond just the well-being
on the poorest segment of the population,
then the United States holds a clear edge.
There is also some evidence that Nordic
nations are moving in the wrong direction,
particularly when compared with other
European nations with smaller burdens of
government. As one researcher explained,
“Over the last decade, the incomes of the
poorest 10% of the population have grown
eight times faster in Ireland than in Sweden,
and six times faster in Britain. As a result, so-
called Anglo-Saxon economies like Ireland
and the UK now for the first time have a
smaller proportion of their population below
the poverty line than does Sweden.”29 This
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may be more a reflection of positive reforms
in nations such as Ireland rather than an
indicator of problems in countries like
Sweden, but it does suggest that strong eco-
nomic growth is better than income redistri-
bution if the goal is to help the least fortu-
nate in society.
The United States has enjoyed faster eco-
nomic growth than Nordic nations. Moreover,
per capita GDP is higher in the United States,
as are levels of disposable income and private
consumption. Unemployment is modestly
lower in America, and per capita wealth is sig-
nificantly higher. The Nordic Model may be
instructive, but not in the way advocates claim.
The Costly Nordic 
Welfare State
Why are people in the United States more
prosperous than their Nordic counterparts?
Is it by chance, the result of different endow-
ments, or the consequence of policy choices?
Regarding the latter possibility, policymakers
in America and the Nordic nations have
made divergent choices about the burden of
government.
Government Spending
As seen in Figure 10, government spend-
ing consumes a larger share of GDP in all
Nordic nations than it does in the United
States. Sweden has the biggest burden of gov-
ernment, followed by Denmark and Finland,
with Iceland and Norway closer to the
American level. The larger burden of govern-
ment presumably does not bode well for
Nordic competitiveness since this means
politicians and bureaucrats have more power
over how resources are allocated. And since
policymakers are more likely to be influenced
by political considerations rather than eco-
nomic factors, that undermines economic
performance.30
But not all government spending is creat-
ed equal. Economists generally find that
some forms of government spending cause
less damage (or even generate some benefits),
particularly outlays for physical infrastruc-
ture and education. That does not necessari-
ly mean that spending in those areas leads to
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faster growth, but it does mean that there are
some benefits to offset at least some of the
costs associated with shifting resources from
the productive sector of the economy to gov-
ernment.
Other types of spending, by contrast, are
more likely to weaken economic perfor-
mance, particularly consumption spending
and transfer outlays.31 Figure 11 shows that
governments in Nordic nations are much
more likely to spend money in these areas. 
Aggregate Tax Burden
High levels of government spending, not
surprisingly, are associated with higher levels
of taxation. Figure 12 shows total receipts
(including non-tax revenues) and tax rev-
enues for the United States and the Nordic
nations. Total receipts is an important mea-
sure since it is a rough approximation of the
amount of money being transferred from the
productive sector to government, whereas tax
revenue is an important measure since it is a
rough approximation of the extent to which
the fiscal system discourages work, saving,
investment, and entrepreneurship.
Marginal Tax Rates
But just as all types of spending are not
equal, neither are all forms of taxation.
Revenues raised by a low-rate consumption
tax impose only a modest burden on eco-
nomic performance. Revenues collected as
the result of high tax rates on productive
behavior, by contrast, are likely to be associ-
ated with lower levels of work, saving, invest-
ment, and entrepreneurship.
Key factors to examine include the top tax
rates on individual income and corporate
income, but double taxation of dividends
and capital gains is also an important gauge
of the tax code’s bias against saving and
investment, as are direct taxes on capital,
such as death taxes and wealth taxes. The
existence of such taxes, particularly if tax
rates are non-trivial, reduces incentives to
engage in wealth-creating activities. 
Looking at taxes on personal income, the
United States has a significant advantage over
most Nordic nations. As seen in Figure 13,
Denmark, Sweden, and Finland all impose
much higher tax rates on personal income.
Norway’s top tax rate is significantly higher if
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the payroll tax rate is included. Iceland, how-
ever, has a less punitive system for highly suc-
cessful taxpayers, and Norway actually has a
slight advantage over the United States if mea-
suring only the personal income tax.
Another key difference between America
and the Nordic nations is that top tax rates
penalize a much larger share of the popula-
tion in Nordic nations. In every Nordic
nation, the top tax rate is imposed on tax-
payers with middle-class incomes. Norway is
the most lenient of the Nordic nations,
allowing taxpayers to earn the equivalent of
about $75,000 before the top tax rate takes
effect. Taxpayers in the United States, by con-
trast, do not get hit with the highest tax rate
until income climbs to more than $336,000.  
On the other hand, every Nordic nation
enjoys a lower corporate tax rate than the
United States. Corporate income in the
United States is taxed at 39.3 percent, while
the tax rate in Nordic nations is no higher
than 28 percent.32 As seen in Figure 14,
Americans firms face a competitive disadvan-
tage in this key measure.
Many other tax measures also play a role.
Payroll taxes reduce incentives to work, and
these levies tend to be more onerous in Nordic
nations. Taxes on saving and investment are
especially important, with the United States
also having a modest advantage in this area.
America’s biggest advantage, though, is the
tax burden on consumption. Value-added
taxes (VATs) tend to be less destructive than
income taxes, but they still undermine growth
by driving a wedge between earnings and con-
sumption. Simply stated, people sacrifice
leisure and earn income because of the things
money can buy. But if taxes reduce the
amount of possible consumption—either
because the money is taxed when earned or
spent, then there is less incentive to be pro-
ductive. The United States does not have a
VAT, but all Nordic nations have high-rate
VATs, with Sweden and Denmark imposing
the maximum rate of 25 percent.33
The absence of a VAT does not mean there
is no tax burden on consumption in the
United States. Sales taxes are imposed by 45
states, and the federal government imposes
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numerous excise duties. Moreover, the tax
burden on consumption in Nordic nations is
not as onerous as the rates suggest since
some goods and services benefit from prefer-
ential rates. Yet, as illustrated in Figure 15,
even with these caveats, the tax burden on
consumption is about three times higher in
Nordic nations than it is in the United States. 
Does Big Government
Explain the Gap between
the United States and
Nordic Nations?
Although rich by world standards, Nordic
nations are not as prosperous as the United
States. Nordic nations also have bigger gov-
ernments than the United States. The obvious
question to ask is whether these facts are relat-
ed. Is excessive government the reason Nordic
nations are not as wealthy as America?
While this paper does not seek to answer
whether this correlation necessarily means that
big government is causing the economy in
Nordic nations to lag America’s economic per-
formance, there is ample evidence that exces-
sive government spending34 and high tax
rates35 hinder economic growth. Moreover,
there do not appear to be other factors that
would be causing economic growth in America
and the Nordic nations to follow divergent
paths.
Nordic Nations:
A Laissez-Faire Past and
a Hopeful Future
As shown in Figure 16, the tax burden in
Nordic nations and America was remarkably
similar until 1960. Not coincidentally, it was
during this pre-1960 era that Nordic nations
grew rapidly and became rich.
Beginning in the mid-1960s, and accelerat-
ing through the 1970s and into the 1980s,
however, the Nordic nations created large wel-
fare states. Indeed, this is the key difference
between America and the Nordic nations. The
United States has a medium-sized welfare
state and the Nordic nations have large welfare
states. Otherwise, America and the Nordic
nations have many features in common. Both
15
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the Nordic nations and America have sound
institutions, including stable currencies, rule
of law, and property rights. Both the Nordic
nations and America have relatively open mar-
kets. Indeed, if the “size of government” factor
is removed from the Economic Freedom of the
World indicators, Nordic nations score an aver-
age of 8.35, ranking above the 8.25 score for
the United States.36
Other measures indicate the Nordic
nations have sound institutions and pro-
growth policies in areas other than fiscal poli-
cy. The World Bank publishes comprehensive
rankings of national business environments.
The United States is near the top of the list,
ranked third, but all the Nordic nations rank
among the world’s most open economies for
business activity. Finland has the lowest rank-
ing, but is still 14th out of 175 nations.37
The World Bank rankings are not an out-
lier. Reviewing 11 different competitiveness
scorecards, the United States has an average
ranking of 6.6, compared to 10.6 for Nordic
nations.38 America scores slightly better, but
the United States and the Nordic nations are
all considered among the world’s most com-
petitive nations. There are even some areas
where Nordic nations score above the United
States. In the first international ranking of
property rights, for instance, the United States
trails the four Nordic nations in the survey.39
Norway is number one, Sweden and Denmark
are tied for third, and Finland ranks number
11—all above the number 14 ranking for the
United States.
The Nordic nations also have excellent rep-
utations for honest government. According to
Transparency International, the five Nordic
nations rank among the eight least corrupt
nations in the world, with Finland and Iceland
tied for first place.40 The United States also
does well, with a ranking of 20 out of 163
nations, but the higher scores for the squeaky-
clean Nordic nations presumably help offset
the larger burden of government. 
The Nordic nations also deserve attention
for important reforms. Iceland, for instance,
has a flat tax (albeit with a 36 percent rate),
personal retirement accounts, and quasi-pri-
vatized fisheries. Sweden, meanwhile, has an
extensive school choice system and personal
retirement accounts.
Prosperity and 
the Welfare State:
Understanding Causality
Many prosperous nations in Western
Europe have large welfare states. This leads
unsophisticated observers to sometimes assume
that high tax rates and high levels of govern-
ment spending do not hinder growth. Indeed,
they sometimes even conclude that bigger gov-
ernment somehow facilitates growth. After all,
government in Sweden is larger than it is in
many nations that have lower living standards.
This analysis puts the cart before the horse.
It is possible for a nation to become rich and
then adopt a welfare state. There is even a rela-
tionship studied in academic literature, known
as Wagner’s Law, which revolves around the
tendency for policy makers to expand the size
of government once nations obtain a certain
degree of prosperity.41 A poor nation that
adopts the welfare state, however, is unlikely to
ever become rich.  
Before the 1960s, Nordic nations had mod-
est levels of taxation and spending. They also
enjoyed—and still enjoy—laissez-faire policies
and open markets in other areas. These are the
policies that enabled Nordic nations to pros-
per for much of the 20th century. Once their
countries became rich, politicians in Nordic
nations focused on how to redistribute the
wealth that was generated by private-sector
activity. This sequence is important. Nordic
nations became rich, and then government
expanded. This expansion of government has
slowed growth, but slow growth for a rich
nation is much less of a burden than slow
growth in a poor nation. 
Conclusion
Residents of Nordic nations sometimes
express public pride in their model, but their
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private behavior presents a more complicated
picture. Many productive people have depart-
ed for lower-tax jurisdictions. Others remain,
but they move their assets so they are hidden
from tax authorities.
Sometimes this hidden discontent becomes
visible. Four of the five Nordic nations now
have right-leaning governments. The Swedes
elected a conservative coalition government
late last year and the Finns made a similar
choice earlier this year.42
It is unclear whether electoral changes will
lead to government reform. But if residents of
Nordic nations want faster growth, more pros-
perity, and improved competitiveness, they
need to reduce the size of the public sector.
Excessive government diminishes growth.
And although the Nordic countries’ relatively
free markets mitigate the damage caused by
high taxes and high spending, the burden of
government is hindering economic perfor-
mance. The Nordic Model is preferable to the
Continental or Corporatist Model of nations
such as France and Germany, which combines
welfare state policies and interventionism. But
the Nordic Model does not look very impres-
sive when compared to the United States.
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